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Empirical research on executive compensation has focused almostexclusivelyon the
incentives provided to chief executive officers. However, firms arerunby teams of managers, and
a theory of the firm should also explain the distribution of incentives and responsibilities for other
members of the top management team. An extension of the standard principal-agent model to allow
for multiple signals of effort predicts that executives who have other, more precise signals of their
efforithan firm performance will have compensation that is less sensitive to the overall performance
of the firm. We test this prediction in a comprehensive panel dataset of executives at large
corporations by comparing executives with explicit divisional responsibilities to those with broad
oversight authority over the firm and to CEOs. Controlling for executive fixed effects and the level
of compensation, we find that CEOs have pay-performance incentives that are $5.85 per thousand
dollar increase in shareholder wealth higher than the pay-performance incentives of executives with
divisional responsibility. Executives with oversight authority have pay-performance incentives that
are $1.26 per thousand higher than those of executives with divisional responsibility. The aggregate
pay-performance sensitivity of the top management team is quite substantial, at $30.24 per thousand
dollar increase in shareholder wealth for the median firm in our sample. Our work sheds light on the
alignment of responsibility and incentives within firms and suggests that the principal-agent model
provides an appropriate characterization of the internal organization of the firm.
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Public corporations are I-un by teams of top managers. Each of thesemanagers has different
responsibilities. Chief operating officers, for example, have broad oversight authority for the firm
as a. whole. Heads of large divisions have more narrowly defined authority but bear directrespon-
sibility for a subset of the firm's activities. As top managers have different levels and areas of
authority, they will have different measures of performance that can be used to provide incentives.
Using a standard principal-agent model, we show that the sensitivity of compensation to firm
performance will depend on how precisely performance is measured for all areas for which the
manager is responsible. In particular, managers with precise signals of effort other than firm per-
forma.nce will receive less exposure to overall firm performance in their compensation. We test the
predictions of the model and find evidence that managers with explicit divisional responsibilities
have lower pay-performance sensitivities than managers with broad oversight authority, who in
turn have lower pay-performance sensitivities than do chief executive officers (CEOs).
The finding that incentives differ across job classifications is important for two reasons. First,
a central issue for understanding the internal organization of the firm is the alignment of incentives
and responsibilities among the top management team. An analysis based solely on CEOs cannot
determine whether incentives are affected by differences in managerial responsibility We show
that pay-performance incentives differ across executives according to their responsibilities and are
structured to motivate managers, subject to the shareholders' informational constraints about
each manager's effort. Second, most of the existing literature on the magnitude of incentives
provided by compensation contracts focuses exclusively on chief executive officers (e.g., Lambert
and Larcker (1987), Jensen and Murphy (1990), and Hall and Liebman (1998)). This approach
ignores the fact that there are other members of the top management team who may also have
significant incentives. We show that incentives provided to the CEO are 42 percent of the aggregate
incentives to the top management team (defined as the top five executives) in our data. The median
pay-performance sensitivity of the top management team is $30.24 per thousand dollar increase
in shareholder wealth.
We generate predictions using the principal-agent model of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987).
In this model, the primary means for shareholders to ensure that managers take optimal actions is
1to tie managers' compensation to the performance of their firms; that is, to provide high-powered
incentives for managers to maximize the returns to shareholders. We use a generalization of
the model that allows the shareholders to observe two potentially correlated signals about the
manager's effort. The first signal continues to be the performance of the firm as a whole, as in
the standard model. The second signal is an individual-specific measure of performance. For
example, the second signal for a manager with divisional responsibility could be a measure of
divisional performance based on accounting data. We show that the structure of incentives wifi
depend upon the relative precision of the two signals, with more weight placed on the more precise
signal.
The most informative signal for CEOs is firm performance, measured by total returns to share-
holders. Firm performance is also quite informative for managers with oversight authority for
the entire firm. Managers with oversight authority may also have an individual signal such as a
subjective report by the CEO on their performance. By contrast, managers with divisional respon-
sibility have a relatively more precise signal than overall firm performance. Their compensation
should depend more heavily on divisional performance. We argue that the pay-firm performance
sensitivity will be higher for CEOs than for managers with oversight authority, who will in turn
have a higher sensitivity than will managers with divisional responsibility. Our focus on man-
agerial responsibilities allows us to provide a new test of the principal-agent model of executive
compensation.
We use data on executive compensation from the Standard and Poor's ExecuComp dataset.
Our sample consists of comprehensive data for the top five executives (ranked annually by salary
and bonus) from the S&P 500,S&PMidCap 400, and S&P SmailCap 600 companies from 1993 to
1997. The sample design allows us to consider the pay-performance sensitivities of managers based
on their responsibilities within the firm. Because data on individual or divisional performance
within firms are not systematically available for a large cross-section of firms, we test predictions
relating to the sensitivity of compensation to firm performance rather than to individual or di-
visional performance measures. In general, the model can be tested without the econometrician
observing the other measures of performance. As we show, the sensitivity of compensation to
firm performance will be affected in a straightforward way by the presence of other performance
2measures.
We classify managers into four mutually exclusive groups: CEOs, executives other than CEOs
with oversight authority for the entire firm, executives with divisional responsibility, and executives
with neither oversight authority nor divisional responsibility. We find evidence that incentivesare
structured differently for executives with different responsibilities, as predicted by the theory. In
practice, optimal incentive contracts will structure managerial compensation so that it is corre-
lated with the total return to shareholders, typically through ownership of shares of the firm's
stock or grants of options on the firm's stock. This correlation is the pay-performance sensitivity.
Managers with oversight authority who are not the CEO have significantly higher pay-performance
sensitivities than do managers with divisional responsibility. The median pay-performance sensi-
tivity for managers with oversight authority is $3.14 per thousand dollar increase in shareholder
wealth, 70 percent higher than the median pay-performance sensitivity of $1.84 per thousand
for managers with divisional responsibility. Both sets of managers have significantly lower pay-
performance sensitivities than the median value of $12.77 for CEOs. Top managers classified as
having neither oversight authority nor divisional responsibility have a median pay-performance
sensitivity of $1.77. These results suggest that the principal-agent model describes not only the
incentives for CEOs but those for other managers within a firm as well.
It is important to be clear about what our results show. Our findings do not relate to the level
of pay. While it is true that the level of pay varies by job classification, this is not a surprising
or novel result. Differences in the level of pay by job classification may reflect differences in the
ability of managers or differences in the demands of a given job. Our findings show differences in
pay-performance sensitivities or incentiws by job classification, after controlling for differences in
the level of pay. In addition, because we observe executives over several years and during that
period, some executives change jobs, we are also able to control for executive fixed effects in our
estimation. Controlling for executive fixed effects and the level of compensation, we find that
the pay-performance incentives of CEOs are $5.85 per thousand dollar increase in shareholder
wealth higher than the pay-performance incentives of executives with divisional responsibility.
Executives with oversight authority have pay-performance incentives that are $1.26 per thousand
higher than the pay-performance incentives of executives with divisional responsibility.
3The inclusion of fixed effects demonstrates that the estimated differences in pay-performance
incentives across groups reflect changes in compensation contracts that occur when executives
actually switch groups. The differences cannot be the result of cross-sectional variation in executive
characteristics alone. Based primarily on these results, we systematically consider and reject a
number of alternative explanations for our results in Section 5. Overall, our findings are consistent
with a principal-agent model in which there are differentially informative signals about managers'
provision of effort.
Our paper is related to several papers that examine executive compensation in the context of
the principal-agent model. Banker and Datar (1989) and Lambert and Larcker (1987) also develop
a principal-agent model with two signals that predicts that compensation will be more sensitive
to the more precisely measured signal. Banker and Datar (1989) conduct no empirical tests.
Lambert and Larcker's (1987) analysis differs from ours in that they focus only on CEOs and use
directly observable measures of stock and accounting returns as their performance measures. In
contrast, in our analysis, we test for differences in compensation contracts across managers with
different responsibilities within the firm. Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994) note that managers
will have different measures of performance that can be used to provide incentives in the context
of subjective performance evaluation. Murphy (1985) shows empirically that pay-performance
sensitivities do vary by job title in a sample of 461 executives at 72 firms, but he does not relate
these differences to the principal-agent model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a principal-agent
model in which shareholders optimally determine compensation based on multiple signals of the
manager's effort. In Section 3, we describe the compensation data and discuss the managerial job
classifications that we use to test the model. The econometric results are presented in Section
4. The main empirical result is that executives with specific divisional responsibility have lower
pay-performance sensitivities than executives who have oversight authority for the entire firm, who
in turn have lower pay-performance sensitivities than CEOs. Section 5 discusses the robustness
of our results to alternative explanations and Section 6 concludes.
42. The Principal-Agent Model
In this section we illustrate how the structure of incentives will differ for managerswithdifferen-
tially informative signals about their performance. As in Banker and Datar (1989), we consider
a setting in which there are two signals about each manager's effort choice. We show that each
manager is compensated more heavily based on the more informative signal under the optimal con-
tract. In the next section, we use this intuition to identify managers with different responsibilities
who will therefore receive different incentives. The key point of this section is that managers with
precise performance measures other than firm performance will receive lower pay-firm performance
sensitivities.
We use a version of the Holmstrom-Milgrom (1987) linear principal-agent model. Within a firm,
there are N risk-averse agents (the managers) and one risk-neutral principal (the shareholders).
The agents' effort choices, e, yield profits (gross of compensation) of
(1)
to the principal, where e is a normally distributed shock to profits with variance o(eN[O,of]).
Theperformance measures observable to the principal are profits and a measure of individual
performance x where
(2)
and O is an individual shock with O 's..N[O,tTJ. The correlation between any O and e is p. The
individual signal may be divisional performance, accounting performance, or any other measure
that is informative about the individual's effort. Any measure such as accounting performance or
divisional performance can be differentially informative for different managers, which is why the
shock 0, is individual-specific. For example, if x, is an individual-specific measure of divisional
performance, it will be quite informative for the divisional manager (low o)butuninformative
for the CEO (high oj).Inaddition, the individual-specific signal need not be the same for all
managers. Shocks are not observable to the principal.
The timing is as follows.First, contracts are signed with the N agents.Next, agents
make effort choices. The profit shock and the individual shocks are realized simultaneously after
the agents' effort choices. Profits are realized and the principal observes both profits and the
5individuai-specific signals for all of the agents.Agents are then compensated based on both
profits and the individual signals as specified in the contract.
Effort is costly for the agents. We assume that each manager's cost of effort function is
where k is the curvature of the disutility of effort function. Each manager's compensation contract
is:
=a1ir+ c2,x, + 13,. (3)
c1 is the weight on firm performance in the compensation contract and is what we refer to as the
pay-performance sensitivity. a2 is the weight on the individual performance measure. 13isthe
component of compensation unrelated to performance. Each manager has negative exponential
utility where r is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Standard results for the linear principal-
agent model (e.g., Banker and Datar (1989)) show that the optimal contract for each manager i
is:
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These contracts exhibit the feature either that both a, and 4arepositive or that one is positive
and one is negative. The agent is either compensated positively for both firm performance and
individual performance, or there is relative performance evaluation in which the less precise signal
is used to filter the more precise signal.'If the performance measures are approximately equally
noisy (c close to o) or if the correlation p, between the signals is small or negative, then the
optimal contracts will put a positive weight on both firm performance and individual performance.
Under the assumption that the two signals are uncorrelated (p =0)the pay-firm performance
iAggarwalnd Samwick(1999a, b)bnd no evidence of relative performance evalu&tion using industry performance
as the second signal.
6sensitivity ()hasthe following comparative statics properties:2
Oat, —2oo (1+ kro1) — 2<0. (5) 8o (cxi + u + kraciL)
= 2>0 (+c + krocr)
The first prediction is that the the pay-firm performance sensitivity is decreasing in the standard
deviation of the firm performance measure. In Aggarwal and Sainwick (1999a), we show that
.J1L<0holds for top executives. This result continues to hold if we disaggregate executives by
job classification, as we show in Section 4. The second prediction is that the pay-firm performance
sensitivity is increasing in the standard deviation of the individual performance measure. We
8o. . . focuson the second prediction (> 0)for the main empirical work in this paper. We use
job classifications as a proxy for differing o-,. We claim that CEOs have higher variances of
the individual performance measure than do executives with oversight authority who, in turn,
have higher variances of the individual performance measure than do executives with divisional
responsibility. In effect, executives with divisional responsibility have a divisional performance
measure on which they can be compensated, while CEOs and those with oversight authority do
not. As a result, our model predicts that executives with divisional responsibility will have lower
pay-firm performance sensitivities in the optimal contract than executives with oversight authority
who will have lower pay-firm performance sensitivities than CEOs.
2Uonceptuafly,the tndivldual-specuic signai can always be made orthogonal to firm performance by splitting it
into two components, one perfectly correlated with firm performance and the other orthogonal, and treating the
orthogonal component as the individual signal. That is, redefine the individual signal to be
09,r.
05
ii isorthogonal to s.
If the individual signal is not redefined to be orthogonal to firm performance, then the comparative static
predictions are:
—2oc- (i + k?.OL)+ pic,(o + o + 2koop+ kroa (i —
—
—2o5o9p+kroo- (1—p))2
8a.2øra —po(o + —kroo(i —
&.(o + o —2uo1p,+ kroo• (i —
Sufficientconditions for 1.i<0and >0are that p, is small or negative or that a is close to o. These
conditions also imply that a, >0and a, > 0. As a result, the comparative static predictions on which we focus
are <0 and >0.
73. Data
Our main source of data is Standard and Poor's ExecuComp dataset, a supplement to the Compu-
stat database. We use ExecuComp to construct our measures of executive compensation and firm
performance. ExecuComp contains data on all aspects of compensation for the top five executives
(ranked annually by salary and bonus) at each of the firms in the S&P 500, S&P Midcap 400, and
S&P SmailCap 600. Due to enhanced federal reporting requirements for fiscal years ending after
December 15, 1992, the ExecuComp data for 1993 through 1997 are virtually complete.3 The
ExecuComp data are collected directly from the companies' proxy statements and related filings
with the Securities Exchange Commission. We also determine the executives' managerial respon-
sibilities based on their job title reported in ExecuComp. We calculate the variance of monthly
stock returns using data from the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP).
3.1ClassifyingExecutives Based on Responsibilities
We classify executives into four groups based on their job title reported in ExecuComp. The
classification scheme is dedgned to correspond to the relative weight that would be put on firm
performance in an optimal compensation contract given the availability of other potentially in-
formative signals of the executives' efforts. The job title reported in ExecuComp is up to thirty
characters in length and corresponds most closely to the title reported by the firm in the summary
compensation table of its DEF 14A ffling to the SEC.4
The first group is chief executive officers. CEOs clearly have a responsibility for all aspects of
firm performance, and the most logical measure of their efforts, broadly defined, is the total returns
to their shareholders. CEO status is determined directly by ExecuComp to be the individual who
held the title for the greatest extent during the year. Thus, each firm has only one CEO in each
year in our sample.
For all other executives, total returns to shareholders are clearly correlated with their effort,
but because of the assignment of responsibilities within the firm, this measure of performance may
be relatively less informative than the individual-specific signal. Executives can be distinguished
based on whether they clearly have oversight authority for the performance of the firm as a whole.
See StandardandPoor's (1995) for documentation of the ExecuComp dat.aset. Our analysisinthis paper us
theOctober 1998 release of the data.
Recent filingsarepublicly available electronicaUy at www,sec.gov.
8Our second group is comprised of the most prominent examples of such executives—presidents,
chairmen, vice-chairmen, chief financial officers (CFOs), and chief operating officers (COOs)—who
are not the CEO. This group should have pay-performance incentives that are lower than those of
the CEOs and higher than those of other executives. Table 1 shows that of the executives in this
group, the percentages reporting each occupation are: president (30.28), chairman (11.02), vice-
chairman (12.27), COO (27.03), and CFO (42.55). Also included are other chief executives whose
reported title includes CEO but who are not identified as the CEO by ExecuComp, comprising
6.08 percent.5 The sum of the percentages exceeds 100 because executives often have titles that
include more than one of these occupations.
The most important difference between groups for our purposes is whether the executive is
listed as a top executive of a division within the firm. Our third group is comprised of all executives
without oversight authority who meet this criterion. Table 1 provides a distribution of executives
with divisional responsibility by the aspect of the firm they manage. The top row of the Divisional
group shows that 74.02 percent of the group is listed as a top executive of a subsidiary or an
international division, or as being in charge of a specific product line. Examples include "Chmn. &
CEO-sub.," "Chmn. & CEO-Hughes Elec.," "Exec. v-p & pres.-N. America," "Sr. v-p-Europe,"
and "Group v-p-wood products." The remaining 25.98 percent is listed as having production-
related responsibilities. Examples of titles for these executives include "Sr. v-p-engineering,"
"Exec. v-p-research & dey," "Exec. v-p-manufacturing," and "Exec. v-p-steel ops." Because
the executives in the Divisional group bear direct responsibility for the performance of a division
within the firm, shareholders receive a fairly precise signal of their efforts in the performance of
that division. As a result, the sensitivity of their pay to the overall performance of the firm is
lower than it is for executives in the Oversight group.
The fourth and final group consists of executives who have neither explicit divisional responsi-
bility nor primary oversight authority. Table 1 shows that 57.07 percent of these executives have
corporate infrastructure responsibilities while 42.93 percent are simply designated vice-president,
senior vice-president, or executive vice-president with no further information provided. Titles for
executives with corporate infrastructure responsibilities include "Treasurer," "Secretary," "Con-
Ihis occurs in someyears rn which there is turnoverinthe CEO position. Two executives atthe firm can have
CEO reported in their titles, but ExecuComp will designate only one of them as the CEO of the firm. Excluding
these observations from the sample does not qualitatively affect our results.
9troller," "General counsel," "Sr. v-p-human resources," "V-p-corp. planning & dev," "Sr. v-p.
marketing," and "Exec. v-p-acctg. & finance." The Neither group should have pay-performance
sensitivities lower than those for executives with oversight authority because the overall perfor-
mance of the firm is a relatively less precise signal of their efforts than it is for the Oversight
group. However, there is no clear prediction for the magnitude of this group'sincentives relative
to those for executives with divisional responsibility.
In summary, our algorithm for allocating executives to job categories is as follows. We use
ExecuComp's identifier for the CEO of each firm in each year. Any of the remaining executives
who are listed as the CEO, chairman, vice-chairman, president, COO, or CFO of the overall firm
are allocated to the Oversight group. Of the remaining executives, those whose titles indicate
a divisional responsibility are allocated to the Divisional group. The remaining executives are
allocated to the Neither group. Both authors independently checked the allocation of executives
to groups, observation by observation. This ensured that all executives are correctly classified,
conditional on their reported titles in ExecuComp.6
3.2 Calculating Incentives
Jensen and Murphy (1990) demonstrate that although incentives can be provided to executives
through various forms of compensation, the majority of incentives come from holdings of stock
and options. Hall and Liebman (1998) show that incentives from stock and particularly stock
options have grown substantially since the sample period used by Jensen and Murphy (1990). As
a result we focus primarily on incentives provided by stock and options.
ExecuComp contains precise data on annual flow compensation, including the details of options
granted in the current year. It also Contains precise data on executives' holdings of stock in their
own companies and summary information on the value of options granted in previous years. For
stock, the pay-performance sensitivity is simply the fraction of the firm that the executive owns.
6 As a lurther check, we directlyexaminedot a subset of proxy statements as they were filed by the sample firms.
In a small number of cases, executives classified as Neither should have been classified as Divisional. For example, a
senior vice-president may be in charge of a divisional group, but the name of the divisional group was not included
in the summary compensation table of the DEF 14A filing. This executive would have been classified as Neither
in our scheme. To examine the potential impact of such classification errors, we treated all of the executives in
the Neither group as if they had divisional responsibilities. When we re-estimated our specifications according to
this classification scheme, we found statistically significant differences between the CEO, Oversight, and the (flew)
Divisional groups as we do in Section 4 below. This is not surprising given that the point estimates for the original
Divisional and Neither groups in our empirical analysis are very close.
10A CEO who holds 3 percent of the stock outstanding in her firm has a pay-performance sensitivity
from stocklioldings of $30 per thousand dollar change in shareholder wealth. In order to calculate
incentives provided by options, we multiply the fraction of the firm's stock on which the options
are written by the deltas of the options.
We calculate option deltas as follows. For option granted in the current year, companies
must report the number of securities, the exercise price, and exercise date. Following Standard
and Poor's (1995), we assume that options are exercised 80 percent (through 1994) or 70 percent
(1995 and later) through their term and use the corresponding 8 and 7 year zero-coupon Teasury
bond rates as the risk-free rates of return!In applying the Black-Scholes formula, we use the
dividend yield for the company reported by ExecuComp and calculate the standard deviation of
monthly stock returns for each company using data from CRSP. We use monthly total returns
to shareholders over the sixty months preceding the sample year. For example, to compute the
standard deviation for a firm in 1993, we calculate the standard deviation of monthly returns from
January, 1988, to December, 1992. If a firm has fewer than sixty but more than twelve months
of data, then we use all of the available data,If a firm has fewer than twelve monthly return
observations, then we exclude it from our sample. We multiply this value by /itoget the
standard deviation of continuously compounded annual returns.
For options granted in previous years, the proxy statement reports only the aggregate number of
securities and the aggregate "intrinsic value" of the options that are in the money. The intrinsic
value is the stock price at the end of the fiscal year less the option's exercise price. Following
Murphy (1998), we treat all existing options as a single grant with a five year remaining term and
an exercise price such that the intrinsic value is equal to that reported on the proxy statement.
Apart from having to impute this exercise price and the time remaining to expiration, the method
for options granted in previous years is the same as for current option grants.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the compensation and incentive measures that we
use in our empirical analysis. For seven variables, the mean, median, and standard deviation
are reported for each group of executives. The first three are the calculated pay-performance
sensitivities from stock, options, and their sum. The pay-performance sensitivities are expressed
ihe risk-tree interest rates used for 192 through 1997 were7.19,5.86, 7.17, 6.50, 6.30 and 6.29 percent, respec-
tively. The 7 and 8 year termsarebased onthe typicalmaturityof 10 years for option grants.
11as percentages of the firm, so that a value of 1 corresponds to a pay-performance sensitivity of
$10 per thousand dollar increase in shareholder wealth. The next two variables are the value of
executives' ownership of stock and options in their firms, also in millions of 1997 dollars. The
final two variables are total flow compensation and long-term components of flow compensation,
expressed in millions of 1997 dollars. Long-term components of flow compensation include grants
of restricted stock, grants of stock options, long-term incentive plan payouts, gross-ups for tax
liabilities, perquisites, preferential discounts on stock purchases, contributions to benefit plans,
and severance payments.8 Total flow compensation includes the long-term components as well
as salary, bonus, and other annual compensation.
CEOs have mean pay-performance sensitivities of 3.99 percent of the firm, with 3.17 percent in
the form of stock and 0.83 percent in the form of options. The medians are substantially lower at
1.28 percent overall, with the median option pay-performance sensitivity of 0.42 percent exceed-
ing the median stock pay-performance sensitivity of 0.39 percent. These patterns are repeated
on a smaller scale for the Oversight group. The Oversight group has higher pay-performance
sensitivities than the Divisional and Neither groups, which in turn have approximately equal
pay-performance sensitivities. In addition, for the Divisional group, the mean and median pay-
performance sensitivity from stock is lower than the mean and median pay-performance sensitivity
from options, respectively. Compared to the CEO and Oversight groups, there are fewer instances
of executives with extremely high stock ownership in the Divisional and Neither groups. Simi-
lar patterns are observed in the dollar values of holdings of stock and options. CEOs have much
higher dollar value holdings of stock and options than the Oversight group, who in turn have largex
holdings than the Divisional and Neither groups. CEOs have mean and median compensation of
$2.74 and $1.49 million, almost double the values of $1.53 million and $847,000 for the Oversight
group. Both the Divisional and Neither groups have compensation of less than $1 million at the
mean and around $600,000 at the median.
Figure 1 graphs median pay-performance sensitivities from stock holdings for each of the four
groups through time. Figure 2 graphs median pay-performance sensitivities from option holdings
Fbr consistency with other work, we use the value of stock options granted as reported in the datuet in our
measure of flow compensation. This application of the Black-Scholes formula is documented in Standard and
Poor'e (1995).
12for each of the four groups through time. Three features of thesegraphs are noteworthy. First,
CEOs have higher pay-performance sensitivities than the Oversightgroup, and the Oversight
group has higher pay-performance sensitivities than the Divisional and Neither groups. Second,
the pay-performance sensitivities for the four groups have generally beenrising through time.
Third, this increase in pay-performance sensitivities is entirely attributable to stock options, not
stockboldings. Stockholdings have remained relatively constant as a share of firm value through
time. This comparison suggests that changes in incentives over our sample periodare the result
of changes in holdings of options rather than stock. Along with Table 2, these figuressuggest
that pay-performance incentives vary quite dramatically by job classification andvary in the way
predicted by the principal-agent model derived earlier. In the following sections, we establish this
empirical result more formally and control for potentially confounding factors.
The remaining variables used in the econometric specifications pertain to the return to share-
holders. ExecuComp provides data on the total return to shareholders in each sampleyear,
specified in percent returns. We subtract the growth in the Consumer Price Index to get real re-
turns.9 Dollar returns to shareholders are equal to the percent returns multipliedby the market
value of the firm at the beginning of the sample year, which is also reported in ExecuComp. The
median dollar return is $92 million and the mean dollar return is $685 million. The variance of
dollar returns is included in the regressions as a determinant of pay-performance incentives. The
variance for each firm is calculated using the monthly dollar returns from CRSP. The standard
deviations of dollar returns are $508 million at the mean and $227 million at the median inour
sample.
4. Empirical Results
Inthis section, we test the theoretical prediction from Section 2 that the sensitivity ofcompen-
sation to overall firm performance will be higher for groups of executives for whom more precise
individual signals of effort are not available. We examine the pay-performance incentives for ex-
ecutives grouped by job classification. In this analysis, we regress the calculated pay-performance
sensitivities for stock and option holdings on the indicator variables for job classificationgroups.
• fle mean andmedian percentreturns are 17.68 and 1218, repectiveIy.
134.1 Median and OLS Regression Results
The principal-agent model clearly predicts that the pay-performance sensitivity is decreasing in the
variance of shocks to the firm's performance. We allow for this effect by including a variable that
is the empirjcaJ cumulative distribution function of the dollar variances of monthly stock returns.
As in Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a), using the CDF of dollar return variances allows us to
calculate the pay-performance incentives at different percentiles in the distribution of variances
directly from the regression coefficients.
The econometric specification for Tables 3 and 4 is:
=io+ 7F (ci) + >g (y + -yF (at)) + -y4w+ht + ejj. (6)
This equation specifies the pay-firm performance sensitivity (a.) of executive i, working at firm
j,inyear t. Divisional executives are the omitted group; the constant (ye) in the regression
pertains to this group. We include the CDF of return variances F (a) separately to capture
the effect of risk on Divisional executives. In our framework, g is an indicator variable for the
group to which the executive belongs: 1) CEOs, 2) Oversight executives, and 3) executives with
neither responsibility. The variables and coefficients that are group specific are indexed by the
superscript k. 'y is the coefficient on the indicator variable g for group k. Significant coefficients
will show differences between group Ic and Divisional executives. We also interact F (c) with
the indicator variables (g) to allow for differential effects of risk on pay-performance sensitivities
by job classification.10
We also include control variables that are critical for identification of our model Many theories
predict that executives with differing job responsibilities have differing levels of pay. One way to
achieve differing levels of pay may be to give executives differing pay-performance sensitivities.
We wish to show that, independent of the level of pay, there is a channel between an executive's
responsibilities and her pay-performance sensitivity. We include the executive's level of com-
pensation (w)asan independent variable to control for any possibly confounding relationship
Io5y using the UDF',pay-perlormance incentivesatany percentileofthe distribution of variancescan easily be
calculated directly (conditional on the year and level of compensation) from the estimated coefficients.Forexample.
an executive in group kata firm with the median stock return variance has pay-performance incentives of +
O.5y1 + (-y +0.5.y). CDFvalues of0 and 1 correspond to the minimum and maximum observed variances in the
sample, where thc pay-performance incentives are y0 + and , + lj + (r + respectively.
14between the level of pay and incentives. There may also be factors that affect incentives outside
of our theoretical model, such as managerial ability, that also affect the level ofcompensation.
In addtion, these factors might vary systematically by group-executives in the Oversightgroup
might have higher average ability than Divisional executives, for example. Including the level of
compensation in the regression is a way to proxy for these factors. We also control for annual
changes in average pay-performance sensitivities (such as the increase over time shown in Figures
1 and 2) by including year dummies (z).
Pay-performance sensitivities have traditionally been based on median stock ownership in a
sample of executives (see Jensen and Murphy (1990)). As shown in Table 2, the mean share
ownership is substantially higher than the median, especially for CEOs, indicating the presence
of outliers with very high ownership. We therefore present estimates of the pay-performance
sensitivities using median regression in Table 3." To examine the robustness of these results, we
also estimate pay-performance sensitivities using ordinary least squares in Table 4.
Table 3 contains the results of equation (6) estimated using median regression.'2The left
column contains results for both stock and options. Divisional executives at the lowest variance
firm (F (u) =0) have pay-performance incentives equal to 0.3473, measured as a percentage of
the firm on a scale of 0 to iOO.' The CEO of the same firm has pay-performance incentives
equal to 0.3473 + 2.5371 =2.8844.Oversight executives at the same firm have pay-performance
incentives equal to 0.3473 + 0.3450 =0.6923.This increase is statistically significant given the
small standard error (0.0140) on the dummy variable for the Oversight group. This increase is
also economically significant as it represents a doubling in incentives (that are not due to the level
of compensation or the year) relative to the Divisional group. The pay-performance incentives of
the Neither group are also statistically significantly greater than those of the Divisional group,
although only 10 percent higher in magnitude (0.0330) at the lowest variance firm. In addition,
jjMedian regression minimizes the sum 01 absolute deviations rather than the sum of squared deviations and is
therefore less sensitive to outliers than is OLS. Further, since the median is a more robust measure of the center
of the data than the mean, the precision of the estimates will also typically be higher hi median regressions. See
Koenker and Bassett (1982) and Bucliinsky (1998) for discussions of median regression estimation.
isHeteroskedasticity robust standard errorra axe reported beneath each coefficient. The standard errors axe calcu-
lated using the bootstrap procedure in Gould (1992) with twenty replications.
,The pay-performance sensitivity also includes the effect of the level of compensation and the time effect, i.e.
w,jt + Pt• In our discussion of explicit pay-performance sensitivities, we focus on comparisons between groups
and so refer to the group-speci6c terms, y, + ,F ()+ g'+7F (o))as the pay-performance
incentives?
15the pay-performance incentives of the CEO group are dramatically larger than the incentives of
the other three groups, and these differences are statistically significant.
We have also included the effect of variance on pay-performance incentives.At the me-
than variance (F (c) =0.5),Divisional executives have pay-performance incentives of 0.3473 +
0.5 *(—0.4076)=0.1435.At the median variance, CEOs have pay-performance incentives of
0.3473+2.5371+0.5*(—0.4076—2.6812) =1.3400and Oversight executives have pay-performance
incentives of 0.3473 + 0.3450 + 0.5 *(—0.4076
—0.3645)=0.3063.As shown in Aggarwal and
Sainwick (1999a), the variance of firm returns has a statistically and economically significant neg-
ative effect on pay-performance incentives. The bottom part of the left column presents the results
of the test that the pay-performance incentives are the same for each of the three groups (CEO,
Oversight, and Neither) as for the Divisional group at the median variance. The low p-values show
that we can reject equality of pay-performance incentives for the CEO group and the Divisional
group, the Oversight group and the Divisional group, and the Neither group and the Divisional
group at the median variance.14
The middle column of Table 3 presents results for holdings of stock only and the right column
presents results for holdings of options only. The same general pattern as holdings of both stock
and options emerges for each component separately. For CEOs, pay-performance incentives at
the median variance firm come somewhat more from stock than from options: 0.0643+ 1.0281 +
0.5 *(—0.0700—1.0741)=0.5204for stock and 0.2109 + 0.6405 + 0.5 *(—0.2615
—0.6823)=0.3795
for options.For the other three groups, substantially more pay-performance incentives come
from options than from stock at the median. The Neither group receives statistically significantly
greater pay-performance incentives from stock than does the Divisional group at the median
variance, but these incentives are economically small. The Neither group receives insignificantly
lower pay-performance incentives from options than does the Divisional group.
The positive coefficients on the level of compensation in each of the three regressions shows that
executives with higher levels of compensation also have higher median pay-performance incentives.
For stock and options together, an increase in compensation of $1 million increases the median
14'ihe predicted values trom the regressions in Table3canbeused to compute the median pay-performance
sensitivity for eachgroup, conditional onthe values of all the explanatory variables. The median conditional pay-
performance sensitivity for CEOs Ia 1.435 percent of the firm or $14.35 per thousand dollar increase in shareholder
wealth. This corresponds to the $14.52 per thousand estimatedinAggarwal and Sainwick (1999a). The median
conditional pay-performance sensitivities for the Oversight, Divisional, and Neither groups are $3.72, $1.98, and
$2.09 per thousand, respectively.
16pay-performance sensitivity by 0.0481percentof the firm.This association is much stronger
for options (0.0366) than for stock (0.0078). Table 2 shows that average compensation levels are
$1.766 and $0559 million higher for CEOs and Oversight executives than for Divisional executives.
Median pay-performance sensitivities reported in Table 2, expressed as a percent of the fIrm, are
higher by 1.0934 and 0.1302 for stock and options together and 0.2993 and 0.0449 for options
only. Thus, comparing CEOs and Divisional executives, differences in compensation account for
4.81 *1.766/1.094=7.75percent of the difference in median total pay-performance sensitivity
and 3.66 *1.766/0.2993=21.60percent of the difference in pay-performance sensitivity due to
options only. Comparing the Oversight and Divisional groups, the corresponding percentages are
20.61 percent for stock and options together and 45.57 percent for options only. While higher
pay-performance incentives are associated with higher levels of compensation, the factors that
might be proxied by the level of compensation only explain a portion of the differences in median
pay-performance incentives by job classification. The differences noted above are estimated to
be statistically significant, even after controlling for differences associated with different levels of
compensation across the groups.
Table 4 contains the results of equation (6) estimated using ordinary least squares without
fixed effects. The coefficients are larger in absolute value relative to the coefficients from the
median regression, reflecting the skewness of the distribution of pay-performance sensitivities.
In almost all cases, the coefficients are of the same sign and as statistically significant as the
coefficients from the median regression. At the median variance, the pay-performance sensitivity
for the Divisional group is 0.5867 —0.5*0.6380=0.2677,nearly double the estimate from the
median regression (0.1435). The estimates from the OLS regression at the median variance for
the CEO, Oversight, and Neither groups are 3.5406, 0.8900, and 0.0591, respectively. Relatively
more of all groups of executives' pay-performance incentives come from existing stockholdings than
from option holdings in the OLS specification. In the median regression specification, relatively
more pay-performance incentives come from option holdings for groups other than the CEO. This
latter finding isconsistentwith the evidence from Table 2 and suggests that the distribution of
stockholdings is particularly skewed.
174.2 FixedEffect Results
The results in Tables 3 and 4 show that there are significant differences in pay-performance
incentives across groups of executives. However, there are other factors that determine incentives.
For example, executives have different levels of ability, reservation wages, risk aversion, and the
disutility or marginal productivity of effort.If these factors also vary systematically across the
four job groups, then the results in Tables 3 and 4 might be driven by these differences rather than
differences in the variances of individual-specific and firm performance measures. To control for
such factors, we estimate pay-performance sensitivities including an executive fixed effect (Aj):
= 'Yo+ y1F(a) +(+ + 74Wjjt++ ).+ (7)
The fixed effect controls for any variation in an executive's pay-performance sensitivity that is
related to a time-invariant characteristic of the executive or the firm.
The interpretation of the coefficients in the fixed effects regression is different from that of
an OLS regression without fixed effects. Some executives switch from one job group to another.
In our sample, 1,745 executives switch groups, representing 6,539 executive-years or about 20
percent of the original observations. What happens to the incentives of executives who switch?
The coefficients in the fixed effects specification are identified primarily by changes in the pay-
performance incentives that executives receive when they switch groups, such as from Divisional
to Oversight. To understand why, consider a simpler specification that includes only the three
dummy variables for the CEO, Oversight, and Neither groups. If no executives switch groups over
the sample period, then the dummy variables will be linear combinations of the fixed effects for the
executives who comprise each group. The fixed effects regression can estimate an effect of being
in one group versus another only when executives switch groups. In our specification, executives
who do not switch groups contribute primarily to the identification of the other variables in the
regression. Any estimated differences in incentives across groups in a fixed effects regression result
onlyfromchanges in incentives that these particular executives receive when they actually switch
groups aver the sample period.
Table 5 contains the results of equation (7) estimated using ordinary least squares with ex-
ecutive fixed effects. As in Tables 3and4, the pay-performance incentives of CEOs are higher
18than those of the Oversight group, which are in turn higher than those of the Divisional group)5
These differences are statistically significant when incentives from Options Only or Stock and Op-
tions together are estimated. When the incentives are estimated excluding options, the difference
between the Oversight and Divisional groups is significant only at the 10.1 percent level. The
incentives for the Neither group are estimated to be higher than those of the Divisional group,
but this difference is not statistically significant.'6
Most of the variation in pay-performance sensitivities in the sample is due to differences in
the average pay-performance sensitivity across individuals. The R2 for the regression, measured
including the fixed effects, is 97 percent for Stock and Options together. However, the independent
variables also explain 11.78 percent of the variation in pay-performance sensitivities that is not
due to the fixed effects. The coefficient on the level of compensation is economically very small at
0.0015 and not statistically significant, suggesting that variation in incentives across groups that
was previously captured by the level of compensation is now absorbed by the fixed effects.
The key differences between the OLS and fixed effect results concerns the size of the differences
in incentives across groups. At the median variance, CEOs have pay-performance incentives that
are 0.5848 higher than those of Divisional executives. When an executive from the Divisional group
is promoted to CEO, her pay-performance incentives increase by approximately 0.6 percent of the
firm or by $6 per thousand dollar increase in shareholder wealth. This increase in incentives is only
one-sixth of the difference of 3.5406 percent of the firm reported in Table 4 for the OLS regression.
Similarly, the difference of 0.1258 between the Oversight and Divisional groups in Table 5 is one-
seventh of the 0.8900 difference reported in Table 4. The large difference between the fixed effects
With tixed effects included,the valueol 'y is arbitrary. The reporting convention is to choose sothatthe
sample average values of the fixed effects (A.) are equal to zero. In this case, 'y no longer represents the pay-
performance incentives for the divisional group at the minimum variance firm (and zero compensation in the omitted
year). However, comparisons of pay-performance incentives across groups based onandare analogous to the
specification without fixed effects.
jgAs shown in Table 1, our Divisional group is comprised of two typos of executives. The first type, making up three
quarters of the group, includes all executives who manage a subsidiary, international division, or specific product
line at the firm.Thesecond type includes all executives who have responsibilities related to production but which
are less specific, such as a vice-president in charge of manufacturing. It might be argued that the second group is
more similar to executives with corporate infrastructure responsibilities or unspecified responsibilities in the Neither
group than to the first type of executives in the Divisional group. We re-estimate the fixed effects specification
with this second type of executive in the Neither group. The differences in pay-performance incentives between
the Divisional group and the other three groups are quite similar to those in the first column of Table 5. Pay-
performance incentives for the Oversight group are 0.1352 higher than those for the Divisional group (compared to
a 0.1344 difference in Table 5). Pay-performance incentives for the CEO group are 0.6207 higher than those for
the Divisional group (compared to a 0.6199 difference in Table 5). These differences are statistically significant.
Thus, our main empirical results are robust to reasonable changes in the classification scheme for executives.
19and OLS estimates reflects the fact that there are many individual-specific determinants of the
pay-performance sensitivity. The fixed effects specification controls for any factor whose effects are
not present when an executive switches job groups. The differences in estimated incentives across
groups that remain after the fixed effects have been included canbe attributed to the presence
of individual-specific signals of effort that characterize the different groups, as predicted by our
theory.
4.3 Flow Compensation Results
Our results thus far have focused exclusively on the incentives provided to executives through
ownership of stock and options. Our theory can also be tested using data on flow compensation.
Because annual compensation does not require direct ownership of the firm, the pay-performance
sensitivity must be estimated according to the "implicit" method discussed in Murphy (1998).
The implicit pay-performance sensitivity is simply the coefficient on performance in a regression
with the level of compensation as the dependent variable. Determinants of the implicit pay-
performance sensitivity can be analyzed by interacting variables, such as the variance of the firm's
stock return or indicator variables for job group, with the firm performance variable. A drawback
to the implicit method is that we cannot include a fixed effect to control for other factors that
affect the pay-performance sensitivity. Our specification for flow compensation is a modification
of (6):
wilt= >Jg' {y +(y + -yF (o))lr1t+ yF (u) + + e. (8)
This equation specifies the compensation (wiji)ofexecutive i, working at firm j,inyear t. In
this equation, gisan indicator variable for the group to which the executive belongs: 1) CEOs,
2) Oversight executives, 3)executiveswith neither responsibility, and 4) Divisional executives.
The variables and coefficients that are group specific are indexed by the superscript k. The other
variables are firm performance, and the CDF of return variances, F
Theterms following the summation capture the effect of performance, return variance, and
the year on the level of compensation. The parameters are all indexed by k to allow for different
effects of each variable on compensation for each group of executives. The first parameter,
isa constant within groups to allow for the differences in average levels of compensation across
groups documented in Table 2. The next two coefficients pertain to the effect of performance
20on compensation. The pay-performance sensitivity for executives in group k is+ F (c),
which will be decreasing in the variance of returns ifis estimated to be negative. We also
include the CDF of the variance itself as an explanatory variable.'7 The final term in braces is a
group-specific year effect, ,whichcontrols for changes in the average level of compensation for
the group in each year.
Table 6 presents the pay-performance sensitivity results using median regression. The pay-
performance sensitivity for CEOs at the median variance is $O.7642 per thousand dollar increase
in shareholder wealth. The last row of the table reports the results of the test of equality between
Divisional executives (k =4)and all other groups at the median variance. More formally, the test
Is:
H0 : ('y + O.57) —('y+ O.57) =0. (9)
The pay-performance sensitivity for CEOs is significantly higher than the pay-performance sen-
sitivities for the other groups. The pay-performance sensitivity of the Oversight executives is
$O.3188 per thousand and is significantly larger than the $0.1617 per thousand for Divisional
executives. The pay-performance sensitivity for the Neither group is $0.1627 per thousand and
is insignificantly different from the Divisional group. The results for annual flow compensation
are consistent with our theory and the results for incentives from stock and options. Executives
with more precise signals of their effort relative to the overall performance of the firm have lower
pay-performance sensitivities than do executives with less precise individual-specific signals.
4.4 Pay-Performance Sensitivities of the Top Management Team
Our data also allow us to calculate pay-performance sensitivities for the top management team.
We define the top management team to be the top five executives at a firm. This definition of the
team is somewhat restrictive, but it is consistent with the SEC reporting requirements and the
ExecuCornp sample design. As we have demonstrated, the pay-performance sensitivity varies by
job classification. For each firm in each sample year, we calculate the team pay-performance sensi-
tivity as the pay-performance sensitivity of the CEO plus four times the average pay-performance
171he principal-agent model is ambiguous on the predicted sign of .y. The CDF of variance is included in the
regressions only to ensure that the cross-sectional relationship we estimate between pay and performance, which
dependsexplicitly onvariance is not affected by a correlation between variance and the level of compensation that
may happen to exist in the data.
21sensitivity of all other executives at the firm for whom pay-performance sensitivities are reported.
Group-specific and aggregate pay-performance sensitivities for the top management team are
reported in Table 7. The pay-performance sensitivities are reported as dollars of compensation
per thousand dollar increase in shareholder wealth, as in Table 6. This measure is simply ten
times the percent of the firm owned explicitly through stock or options.18The first two rows
report the mean and median pay-performance sensitivities from stock and options (as in Table 2),
along with our estimate of the team pay-performance sensitivity. For the top management team,
the mean pay-performance sensitivity is $68.79 per thousand and the median pay-performance
sensitivity is $30.24 per thousand. The third row reports estimated pay-performance sensitivities
from Table 6 for total flow compensation using median regression and conditioning on variance.
In this case, we calculate the group-specific pay-peformance sensitivities at the median variance
and assume that the team is comprised of a CEO and four other executives drawn at random from
the other three groups. The pay-performance sensitivity for the team is $1.61 per thousand.
Past work on compensation has focused almost entirely on the incentives provided to the
CEO. As one example, the debate over whether incentives facing top management are large or
small that began with Jensen and Murphy (1990) and has been recently discussed by Hall and
Liebman (1998) pertains only to CEOs.19 Our estimates show that CEOs receive between 42 and
58 percent of the incentives provided to the top management team. In addition, these calculations
show that the aggregate incentives provided to the top management team are quite substantial.
The mean top management team receives almost 7 percent of the dollar returns to shareholders.
The median top management team receives about 3 percent of the dollar returns to shareholders.
Most of these incentives come in the form of holdings of stock or stock options.
5. Alternative Explanations
Our results demonstrate that there are significant differences in pay-performance incentives across
groups of executives. These differences are consistent with the predictions of a principal-agent
model in which there are multiple signals about an executive's effort. In this section, we consider
18'lables through 5 report paypertormance sensitivities as percentages of the arm owned.
15Sc1,aefer (1998) examines team5 of the four best.paidexecutives by firmin ExecuComp and relates thc teams
compensation to firm size.
22whether other explanations are consistent with the evidence presented here. It is important to note
that our results do not pertain to the level of pay. Many theories predict differences in the level
of pay across categories of managers, and it is certainly true that there are such differences in the
level of pay. In order to explain our empirical results, however, an alternative theory must explain
differences in pay-performance incentives across groups of executives, controlling for differences in
the level of compensation. The alternative explanations we consider are: risk aversion or disutility
of effort, tournaments, dynamic agency, managerial entrenchment, taxes, ability or human capital,
and learning and screening. In general, the inclusion of executive fixed effects, year effects, and the
level of flow compensation in our econometric specification demonstrates that our results cannot
be due only to these alternatives.
5.1 Risk Aversion or Disutility of Effort
The standard principal-agent model with only one measure of performance rather than two allows
for differences in pay-performance sensitivities across groups of executives. The pay-performance
sensitivity in a model with one measure of performance (see Holinstrom and Milgrom (1987))
is a, Sincewe control for the variance of firm performance in our econometric
specification, differences in the pay-performance sensitivity across groups can arise only from
differences in the average levels of risk aversion, r,orthe disutility of effort, k.Ina model with
only one measure of performance, the higher pay-performance sensitivity of the Oversight group
compared to the Divisional group, for example, must be a reflection of lower risk aversion or less
disutility of effort by executives with oversight authority. We control for this psibffity directly
by including executive fixed effects in the pay-performance sensitivity regression. Any differences
in the average values of individual characteristics across groups, including risk aversion and the
disutility of effort, are removed by the fixed effect at the level of the individual executive, assuming
that executives' tolerances for risk or disutility of effort do not change when they switch groups.
5.2 Tournaments
Lazear and Rosen (1981) argue that tournaments can provide incentives to agents. Among top
executives, the CEO position is the reward. CEOs are highly compensated as an inducement for
lower level managers to exert effort in order to be chosen as the next CEO. Strictly speaking,
23this model's predictions are about the level of compensation rather than the pay-performance
sensitivity. However, we cancombinethe tournaments model with a standard principal-agent
model in which there is one measure of performance to generate the following empirical predic-
tions. The CEO receives incentives through the pay-performance sensitivity. All managers below
the CEO get incentives to exert effort from two sources: a pay-performance sensitivity and the
probability of promotion to CEO. In this extension of the tournaments model, the probabil-
ity of promotion and the pay-performance sensitivity are substitute mechanisms for providing
incentives. Consequently, managers with lower probabilities of promotion should have higher pay-
performance sensitivities, and managers with higher probabilities of promotion should have lower
pay-performance sensitivities. We find the opposite result. Managers with oversight authority,
who are closer to the CEO position, have higher pay-performance sensitivities than do managers
with divisional responsibilities, who are on average farther from the CEO position.
5.3 Dynamic Agency
Holmstrom (1999) and Gibbons and Murphy (1992) note that career concerns can provide incen-
tives to managers when they are young. As they near the end of their productive lives, stronger
explicit incentives must be given to them to induce greater effort provision, if CEOs are on aver-
age older than managers with oversight authority, who are, in turn, on average older than those
with divisional responsibilities, then the differences in pay-performance sensitivities that we ob-
serve might be the result of different career concerns across groups. While this story is an agency
story it is a dynamic agency story and does not rely on the presence of an individual-specific per-
formance measure, as our two-sigxial agency model does. Our fixed effect specification is robust to
factors that increase linearly over time, such as age and experience, because it also includes year
dummies.To a firstorder, no individual-specific, trending variable can be generating our results.
As a result, we have controlled for the dynamic agency story and still find an independent effect
due to differences in managerial responsibility.
5.4 Managerial Entrenchment
As managers become more senior or spend more time on the job, they may become more entrenched
in the sense that it is more or costly for the firm to fire them. Shleifer and Vishny (1989)
24argue that managers become entrenched by distortingthe firm's investment choices toward par-
ticular projects that depend more heavily on the managers' particular skills and knowledge. Since
the probability of dismissal is an incentive mechanism that substitutes for the pay-performance
sensitivity, managers who are entrenched must be given compensation contracts with higher pay-
performance sensitivities. According to this model, the degree to which a manager is entrenched
is a function of the manager's tenure at the firm. The observed differences in pay-performance
sensitivities across groups could be the result of greater entrenchment of executives who have
been at their firms longer. This alternative cannot be generating our results because an execu-
tive's tenure at the firm is a characteristic solely of the individual. As such, its effects on the
observed compensation contract will be removed by the inclusion of the executive fixed effects and
the year dummies in the pay-performance sensitivity regressions, just as in the dynamic agency
story above.
A plausible extension of the Shleifer and Vishny (1989) model is that executives can become
entrenched in their particular positions. The length of time that an executive has been in the
position, rather than at the firm, is what determines the degree of entrenchment. When man-
agers switch positions, they become less entrenched and consequently have higher probabilities
of dismissal. As the probability of dismissal is a substitute for the pay-performance sensitivity,
the pay-performance sensitivity should decrease when an executive switches positions. To investi-
gate this hypothesis, we examined the changes in the pay-performance sensitivity when executives
change job groups over the sample period. We find a result inconsistent with this hypothesis in
Table 5-executives who switch from the Divisional group to the Oversight group or the Divisional
group to the CEO group get higher pay-performance sensitivities in their new positions. This
result is consistent with our agency model with two signals, since the higher pay-performance
sensitivity in the new position is due to a change in the performance measures available for the
compensation contract.
5.5Taxes
Analternative explanation for the differences in pay-performance sensitivities across groups of
executives is that they reflect tax-minimizing behavior on the part of firms. The Internal Revenue
Code requires annual compensation in excess of one million dollars to be related to performance
25if it is to be tax deductible at the corporate level.20 Table 3 shows that our ranking of groups
based on the pay-performance sensitivity corresponds to their ranking based on the average level of
compensation. Under the tax-motivated hypothesis, differences in pay-performance sensitivities
across groups might be a consequence of firms trying to pay these executives different average
levels of compensation.
There are two reasons why tax considerations are unlikely to be generating our results. First,
Table 2 shows that CEOs are the only group with median flow compensation in excess of one million
dollars. The other three groups have median flow compensation substantially less than one million
dollars. If factors unrelated to our agency model required average compensation to be higher, then
for most of the executives in these groups, flow compensation could be increased without incurring
a tax penalty. Second, we aiso control for the level of flow compensation directly in all of our
pay-performance sensitivity regressions for stock and options. Any correlation between the level
of flow compensation and the pay-performance sensitivity, whether the result of taxes or some
other factor, is controlled for by this variable. Comparisons of the pay-performance sensitivities
across groups, especially those other than the CEO, are therefore unlikely to be distorted by tax
minimizing concerns.
5.6 Ability or HumanCapital
As discussed in Prendergast (1996), another important determinant of compensation is managerial
ability or human capital. Executives with higher ability and better skills have higher marginal
products and therefore higher reservation wages. It is also plausible that higher ability executives
will be sorted into CEO or Oversight positions. If this is the case, then ability provides an ex-
planation of why CEOs receive higher levels of compensation than do executives with oversight
authority who, in turn, receive higher levels of compensation than executives with divisional re-
sponsibilities. By itself, the ability hypothesis does not explain differences in pay-performance
incentives across groups. Nonetheless, even if firms choose to reward greater managerial abil-
ity with higher pay-performance sensitivities, we have directly controlled for this possibility in
the econometric specification by including both the level of compensation and executive fixed
20SeeSection 162(m)of the Internal Revenue Code. Repetti (1997)provides adiscussion and critique of tax policy
toward executive compensation. Perry and Zenner (1997) use ExecuCoinp to examine the effect of tax policy on
the share of compensation that is performance related.
26effects. The level of compensation removes the effects of differences in compensationon the pay-
performance sensitivity. The executive fixed effects control for unobserved differences in ability
or skills across executives.
5.7 Learning andScreening
Differences in executive abilities may have a more direct impact on pay-performance sensitivities
if some aspects of ability are imperfectly observable. For example,suppose that executives have
private information about their abilities and that firms try to screen executives by ability. In
such a model, accepting a positive pay-performance sensitivity would be costly foran executive
(due perhaps to risk aversion) but would be less costly for more able executives. Therefore, more
able executives would accept higher pay-performance sensitivities and, maintaining theassumption
above, would be sorted into job classifications entailing more oversight authority. As in the ability
story discussed above, the inclusion of executive fixed effects will also control for this possibility.
In the specification with executive fixed effects, we identify differences in pay-performance
incentives across groups based only on the changes in pay-performance incentives that result
when an executive actually switches groups. The results for this specification could not obtain
unless an executive who moves from the Divisional group to the Oversightgroup, for example,
receives a higher pay-performance sensitivity as a result of this move. The private information
story works in the reverse order—an executive chooses a higher pay-performance sensitivity and is
then sorted into the group with more oversight authority. The higher pay-performancesensitivity
must precede the job switch if it is to serve as a signal. We investigated this issue of timing
directly and found that the change in the pay-performance sensitivity for executives who switch
jobs is greater in the year of the job transition than it is in the year prior to the job transition.
Further, the change in the pay-performance sensitivity in the year prior to the job transition for
executives who switch jobs is approximately equal to the change in the pay-performance sensitivity
for executives who do not subsequently switch jobs. These results are consistent our model
but do not support the screening explanation.
As another alternative explanation, suppose that both firms and markets are learning about
executives' abilities through time (see Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Prendergast (1996)). In
such a model, higher ability workers would receive higher compensation, and it is possible they
27receive it in the form of a higher pay-performance sensitivity. This alternative is unlikely to be
driving our results because the revelation of ability is an individual-specific, trending variable.
The effects of learning about ability on the observed compensation contract will be removed by
the inclusion of the executive fixed effects and the year dummies, just as in the dynamic agency
story above.
6. Conclusion
We study empirically the design of incentives for managers with different responsibilities within the
firm. Shareholders' inferences about a manager's effort will depend on the precision of signals of
various performance measures. We exploit the differences in managerial responsibilities to examine
the effect of multiple performance measures on managerial incentives. Using the Holmstrom-
Milgrom (1987) linear principal-agent model, we show that the sensitivity of compensation to firm
performance is lower for groups of managers with precise individual-specific signals about their
effort.
We classify managers into four groups: CEOs, other executives with oversight authority for
the entire firm, executives with divisional responsibility and executives with neither oversight
authority nor divisional responsibility. We argue that executives with divisional responsibility have
more precise individual-specific measures of performance compared to executives with oversight
authority or CEOs. As a result, executives with divisional responsibility should have lower pay-
performance sensitivities. We document that CEOs have higher pay-performance sensitivities than
do executives with oversight authority, who in turn have higher pay-performance sensitivities than
those with divisional responsibility. Our empirical evidence supports the view that the sensitivity
of compensation to the overall measure of firm performance is lower for executives for whom a
more precise individual signal of effort is available. This result provides direct support for the
principal-agent model as a determinant of executive pay deeper in the firm than just the CEO.
We also show that the magnitude of the aggregate incentives of the top management team is quite
substantial.
These results have implications for the theory of the firm and the internal economies of or-
ganizations. Our results support the principal-agent model's prediction that compensation is
structured to share risk between shareholders and managers. More importantly, the degree of
28risk-sharing inherent in the pay-performance sensitivity varies according to the manager's re-
sponsibilities. Our results suggest an important role for performance-related incentives in the
compensation of top managers other than the CEO of a firm. These performance-related incen-
tives are constrained by the principal-agent considerations of information and risk-sharing. The
principal-agent problem should be thought of as pertaining to top management rather than just
to a CEO.
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Chief Executive Officers 6,804(20.25%)



























1) The Oversight and Neither groups are comprised of executives not designated by
ExecuComp to be the CEO of the firm and who are not identified by our classification
procedure as having divisional responsibilities.
2) The sum of the percentages for the categories within the Oversight group exceeds 100 due to
the instances in which executives carry more than one title, e.g., President and COO.
3) In the Oversight group, "Other Chief Executives" are executives who carry the title of CEO
but are not designated by ExecuComp as the CEO of the firm in that year. These executives
are typically CEOs who were replaced early in the year or new CEOs hired or promoted late
in the year.
33Table 2
Compensation and Descriptive Statistics on






























































































Pay-performance sensitivities (PPS) reflect the executives'percentage ownership of the
34Table 2, Continued
Descriptive Statistics on Compensation and Incentives, by Job Classification
GroupandVariable Mean Median Standard Deviation
Total Flow
Compensation
(Millions of 1997 dollars)
CEO 2.739 1.494 5.183
Oversight 1.532 0.847 3.461
Divisional 0.973 0.605 1.324
Neither 0.873 0.555 1.254
Long-Term Components
of Flow Compensation
(Millions of 1997 dollars)
CEO 1.571 0.543 4.381
Oversight 0.879 0.296 3.252
Divisional 0.488 0.190 1.054
Neither 0.417 0.170 0.985
Note:
Long-term compensation is comprised of the following components of flow
compensation: grants of restricted stock, grants of stock options, long-term incentive plan
payouts, gross-ups for tax liabilities, perquisites, preferential discounts on stock
purchases, contributions to benefit plans, and severance payments.
35Table 3
Median Regressions of Pay-Performance Sensitivities on Job Classification
Variable Stock and Options Stock Only Options Only
Constant 0.3473 0.0643 0.2109
(0.0069) (0.0018) (0.0057)
CDF of Variance -0.4076 -0.0700 -0.2615
(0.0079) (0.0025) (0.0080)
CEO 2.5371 1.0281 0.6405
(0.0695) (0.0597) (0.0222)
CEO x CDF -2.6812 -1.0741 -0.6823
(0.0797) (0.0674) (0.0252)
Oversight 0.3450 0.0851 0.1249
(0.0140) (0.0046) (0.0087)
Oversight x CDF -0.3645 -0.0840 -0.1386
(0.0161) (0.0049) (0.0114)
Neither 0.0330 0.0 109 -0.003 5
(0.0094) (0.0027) (0.0070)
Neither x CDF -0.0394 -0.0 106 0.0033
(0.0113) (0.0031) (0.0095)
Compensation 0.048 1 0.0078 0.0366
(0.0025) (0.0009) (0.0020)
Pseudo R-Squared 0.1040 0.0341 0.1 185
Tests for Equality with Divisional Group at Median Variance
CEO 1.1965 0.4910 0.2993
[0.000] [0.0001 [0.000]
Oversight 0.1627 0.0430 0.0555
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Neither 0.0133 0.0056 -0.0019
[0.001] [0.000] [0.453]
Notes:
1) The omitted category of executives is the Divisional group. Coefficients on other
groups pertain to differences between those groups and the Divisional group. Each
specification also includes year effects (not reported).
2) Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors based on 20 bootstrap replications are
reported in parentheses under each coefficient.
3) Test statistics are the difference in the pay-performance sensitivity between the
specified group and the Divisional group at the median variance firm and the p-value
in brackets for the null hypothesis that the difference is zero.
4) The sample size is 13,109 executives in 33,607 executive-years.
36Table 4
OLS Regressions of Pay-Performance Sensitivities on Job Classification
Variable Stock and Options Stock Only Options Only
Constant 0.5867 0.3033 0.2834
(0.0568) (0.0556) (0.0 109)
CDF of Variance -0.6380 -0.2802 -0.3 578
(0.0385) (0.0363) (0.0 176)
CEO 5.8768 4.8710 1.0058
(0.1944) (0.1911) (0.0327)
CEO x CDF -4.6723 -3.7337 -0.9387
(0.3051) (0.3001) (0.0522)
Oversight 1.4681 1.2123 0.2558
(0.0898) (0.0877) (0.0 166)
Oversight x CDF -1.1563 -0.8722 -0.2841
(0.1282) (0.1252) (0.0242)
Neither 0.0967 0.0817 0.0150
(0.0344) (0.03 17) (0.0107)
Neither x CDF -0.0752 -0.045 5 -0.0297
(0.0516) (0.0477) (0.0168)
Compensation 0.0205 -0.0192 0.0396
(0.0074) (0.0078) (0.0065)
R-Squared 0.1509 0.1088 0.1983
Tests for Equality with Divisional Group at Median Variance
CEO 3.5406 3.0041 0.5365
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Oversight 0.8900 0.7762 0.1138
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Neither 0.0591 0.0589 0.0001
[0.0001 [0.000] [0.982]
Notes:
1) The omitted category of executives is the Divisional group. Coefficients on other
groups pertain to differences between those groups and the Divisional group. Each
specification also includes year effects (not reported).
2) Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses under each
coefficient.
3) Test statistics are the difference in the pay-performance sensitivity between the
specified group and the Divisional group at the median variance firm and the p-value
in brackets for the null hypothesis that the difference is zero.
4) The sample size is 13,109 executives in 33,607 executive-years.
37Table 5
FixedEffect Regressions of Pay-Performance Sensitivities on Job Classification
Variable Stock and Options Stock Only Options Only
Constant 1.4233 1.1215 0.3017
(0.0907) (0.0680) (0.063 6)
CDF of Variance -0.5643 -0.4192 -0.1451
(0.1656) (0.1201) (0.1209)
CEO 1.3113 0.9113 0.4000
(0.1819) (0.1674) (0.0789)
CEOxCDF -1.4529 -1.1282 -0.3247
(0.2423) (0.2 184) (0.1140)
Oversight 0.3080 0.1988 0.1092
(0.0989) (0.0883) (0.0465)
Oversight x CDF -0.3643 -0.28 13 -0.0829
(0.1262) (0.1104) (0.0635)
Neither 0.0292 0.0199 0.0093
(0.0672) (0.0512) (0.0451)
Neither x CDF -0.0088 -0.0219 0.013 1
(0.0842) (0.0612) (0.0591)
Compensation 0.0015 -0.0028 0.0044
(0.0039) (0.0033) (0.003 1)
R-Squared
Exci. Fixed Effects 0.1178 0.0696 0.1729
mci. Fixed Effects 0.9709 0.9729 0.8623
Tests for Equality with Divisional Group at Median Variance
CEO 0.5848 0.3472 0.2376
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Oversight 0.1258 0.0581 0.0677
[0.0021 [0.101] [0.000]
Neither 0.0248 0.0090 0.0 158
[0.394] [0.680] [0.436]
Notes:
1) The omitted category of executives is the Divisional group. Coefficients on other
groups pertain to differences between those groups and the Divisional group. Each
specification also includes year effects (not reported).
2) Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses under each
coefficient.
3) Test statistics are the difference in the pay-performance sensitivity between the
specified group and the Divisional group at the median variance firm and the p-value
in brackets for the null hypothesis that the difference is zero.
4) The sample size is 13,109 executives in 33,607 executive-years.
38Table 6
Median Regression Estimates of Implicit Pay-Performance Sensitivities, by Job Classification
CEO Oversight Divisional Neither
Total flow Compensation
y Performance 1.2897 0.5244 0.2487 0.2597
(0.1889) (0.0732) (0.0364) (0.0493)
Y2 Performance' -1.0511 -0.4113 -0.1740 -0.1939
CDF of Variance (0.228 1) (0.0800) (0.0425) (0.055 5)
y3 CDFof 2548 1323 913 822
Variance (47) (29) (18) (13)
Pay-Performance Sensitivity and Hypothesis Tests at the Median Variance
a1 Pay-Performance 0.7642 0.3188 0.1617 0.1627
Sensitivity (0.0795) (0.0339) (0.0160) (0.0221)
P-value for Equality [0.000] [0.000] [0.974)
with_Divisional
Number of Ohs. 6,779 8,812 8,709 9,357
—
Pseudo R-Sguared 0.2191
measured in thousands and dollar returns are measured in millions of 1997
dollars. The pay-performance sensitivity is therefore specified in dollars of compensation per
thousand dollar increase in shareholder wealth.
2) The regression includes year, group, and year-group interaction effects (not reported).
3) Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors based on 20 bootstrap replications are reported in
parentheses under each coefficient and estimate of the pay-performance sensitivity.
4) Test statistics are p-values for the null hypothesis that the difference in the pay-performance





Pay-Performance Sensitivities of the Top Management Team
Type of Regression CEO OversightDivisionalNeither Team
Stock and Options
Mean 39.94 12.50 3.75 4.34 68.79
Median 12.77 3.14 1.84 1.77 30.24
Flow Compensation
Median 0.76 0.32 0.16 0.16 1.62
Notes:
1) For stock and options, the pay-performance sensitivity for each group is reported in
Table 2. The pay-performance sensitivity for the top management team is defined to
be the pay-performance sensitivity for the CEO plus four times the average pay-
performance sensitivity for all other executives in a given year.
2) For flow compensation, the pay-performance sensitivity for each group is reported in
Table 6. The pay-performance sensitivity for the top management team is the pay-
performance sensitivity of the CEO group plus four times the sample weighted
average pay-performance sensitivity of the other three groups.
3) The number of observations in each category is given in Table 1 for the stock and
option estimates and in Table 6 for the flow compensation estimates.
4) All estimates are in dollars of compensation perthousand dollar increase in
shareholder wealth.
40